




ERA Forum (2007) 8:357–371
Abstract this article seeks to illustrate some of the balances which need to be 
reached in gambling regulation in the context of the internal market. Such balances 
are to be found at both the national and European levels. Although the regulation of 
gambling is currently a national competence, Member States have to consider the 
impact of the case-law of the European court of Justice. consequently the balance 
of interests which Member States seek to achieve at national level must be striven 
for in a manner compatible with community law. this is a balancing exercise in 
itself. Further, cross-border consequences arise from nationally-oriented approaches, 
offering both possible solutions and problems for the regulation of gambling in the 
European Union.
Keywords Free movement of services · Gambling
1. Introduction
Each Member State of today’s European Union has an approach of its own to the 
regulation of gambling and for the foreseeable future this is likely to remain so. De-
bates regarding gambling and the regulation thereof within Member States, have, 
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until relatively recently, been of a wholly national nature. Yet with the ever expanding 
scope of the internal market, gambling has become a significant topic of debate at Eu-
ropean Union level, undoubtedly spurred on by the interaction of national laws with 
primary community law. No longer is the discussion of the regulation of gambling 
within Member States wholly national. Rather, it must take into account the require-
ments of community law. 
in their approaches to regulating gambling, many governments have sought to 
balance the human desire to gamble with the negative consequences associated with 
gambling, which principally relate to addiction, crime and fraud. National policies 
usually regulate the quantity and quality of the gambling supplied. thus, some forms 
of gambling may be prohibited or the number of gambling opportunities may be 
limited. Where the provision of gambling opportunities is permitted, two broad ap-
proaches are used to ensure the quality of the gambling services; either the use of a 
state-owned body with a monopoly position, or a licensing regime with a supervisory 
and enforcement mechanism. Frequently, national regulatory regimes distinguish be-
tween different forms of gambling on the basis of a range of factors, including the 
addictiveness of a particular form of gambling or the extent of criminal involvement 
therein. 
to date, the European interest in this field has concentrated upon the compatibility 
of these restrictions with primary community law and the extent to which the internal 
market should extend to gambling. the Europeanisation of this debate began in the 
1990s with a study by the European commission which led to the European council 
concluding that, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, Brussels should desist 
from becoming involved in the regulation of this sector.1 Nevertheless a series of 
cases has come before the European court of Justice, something which has naturally 
led to a debate concerning the relationship between gambling and primary commu-
nity law.2 
the balances which Member States have sought to attain at the national level 
now have to be balanced with the requirements of the internal market, insofar as 
these requirements are deemed applicable to gambling. However, even without any 
community secondary legislation or explicit competence in this field, cross-border 
gambling occurs and the activities of gambling providers have cross-border implica-
tions at community level, a point which will be discussed later in this article. three 
necessary balancing exercises are thus apparent; firstly that which national legislation 
strives for; secondly that between national gambling regulation and European com-
munity law; and thirdly balancing the implications of national gambling providers in 
the internal market context.
Uncertainty prevails in various guises and this article will be dedicated to illustrat-
ing some of the balancing acts which national gambling providers seek to achieve 
when upholding the balance which national legislation establishes. Furthermore, such 
1)
  European commission, Gambling in the Single Market – A Study of the Current Legal and Market Situ-
ation, 1991 and European council, conclusions of the Presidency, Edinburgh, 11 and 12 December 1992 
(DOc /92 /8, 13. 12. 1992).
2)
  See case c-275 /92 Schindler [1994] EcR i-1039; case c-124 /97 Läärä [1999] EcR i-6067; case 
c-67 /98 Zenatti [1999] EcR i-7289; case c-6 /01 Anomar [2003] EcR i-8621; case c-243 /01 Gambelli 
[2003] EcR i-13031; case c-42 /02 Lindman [2003] EcR i-13519; and Joined cases c-338 /04, c-359 /04 
and c-360 /04 Placanica, judgment of 6 March 2007 (not yet reported).
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balancing acts will be viewed in the light of the requirement arising from the case-law 
of the European court of Justice that national gambling policies be consistent and 
systematic, so as to illustrate the complexities involved in complying with the cur-
rently unclear requirements of the case-law. Finally, the need for a degree of balance 
to be found in the cross-border context of the European Union will be highlighted. 
this will lead to a consideration of the elements which a regulatory framework would 
need to include so to achieve these balances. 
in achieving the foregoing, this article will take the following six steps. First, an 
overview of the complexity of the regulatory environment in the European Union 
regarding gambling will be given, inasmuch as it arises from a fragmented approach 
to a common issue. this will be followed secondly by a brief discussion of the princi-
pal case-law. thirdly, the attempts by national providers to balance the requirements 
of national legislation will be assessed in view of the requirements case-law of the 
European court of Justice. two providers will be looked at for illustrative purposes; 
Svenska Spel of Sweden and camelot of the United Kingdom. issues arising due to 
the internal market context will be discussed as a fourth step; followed by the fifth 
step of examining the potential for national concerns regarding tax revenues to cloud 
the debate. in conclusion, a possible framework for future discussions will be con-
sidered.
2. A Complex and Fragmented Situation
taking an overall view, the regulation of gambling within the European Union would 
appear extremely fragmented due to the virtually unlimited national competence to 
regulate gambling activities. the complexity of the web of national laws has been 
exacerbated by the impact of the internet; as a means of communication over a dis-
tance, the internet has broken down barriers between different jurisdictions. these 
two phenomena will be discussed further.
2.1 Numerous jurisdictions
With the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union in 2007, 27 dif-
ferent national gambling jurisdictions now exist. However, it would be inaccurate to 
state that 27 different jurisdictions regulate gambling. in some Member States certain 
aspects of gambling regulation are the responsibility of regional levels of govern-
ment, such as the German Länder as illustrated by the State lottery treaty3 and the 
Spanish comunidades autónomas (autonomous communities).4 Additionally, local 
authorities may play a role, with regards to authorising the location of slot machines 
and casinos for example. A recent and topical example of this has been the willing-
ness of United Kingdom local authorities, such as Blackpool council and Manches-
ter city council, to licence casino operations in their area under the Gambling Act 
3)
  the Staatsvertrag zum Lotteriewesen in Deutschland has regulated German gambling law since July, 
2004. See Arendts /Hambach [1], p. 466.
4)
  For an introduction to the role of the Spanish autonomous communities in the regulation of gambling 




2005. From a community law perspective, gambling regulation is clearly fragmented 
amongst the Member States and their sub-national authorities. consequently, the po-
tential for conflict to arise between Member States themselves and with regards to 
community law is immense.
As will become evident during the following discussion of the case-law, member 
state attempts to regulate gambling can amount to restrictions of the free movement 
of services and the freedom of establishment. While justifications for such restric-
tions may apply in specific cases, the manner in which Member States approach the 
regulation of gambling would appear to lend itself to restricting these two freedoms. 
Broadly speaking, Member States take one of two approaches: they either impose 
a prohibition on gambling or a specific form of gambling, subject to a limited ex-
ception;5 or a licensing regime is adopted, and frequently the number of available 
licences is restricted.6 Furthermore, in some Member States licences can only be 
issued if the would-be provider has a legal presence within that target Member State. 
in some Member States gambling, or a particular form of gambling such as lotter-
ies, is provided by state-owned companies7 while in others the single licence-holder 
enjoys a monopolistic position, although whether there would have been a non-dis-
criminatory competition for the licence – and hence the market – depends upon the 
tender procedure used. While a highly-regulated gambling regime is not per se in 
contravention of community law, the arbitrary exclusion of suppliers established in 
other Member States entails that the regulatory regimes do not have the capacity to 
recognise similar regulatory objectives and standards which apply within other Euro-
pean Union jurisdictions. 
2.2 impact of long-Distance communication
the clash between different jurisdictions has been facilitated by the use of long-
distance communication technology, principally the internet, to supply gambling 
services. With the advent of the internet, and high levels of internet penetration, the 
cross-border supply of gambling services has become increasingly accessible to an 
increasingly wide population base. Gambling via the internet overcomes many of 
the inconveniences which apply to offline gambling products, such as the time and 
expense it would take residents of one Member State to visit another Member State to 
take advantage of the availability of casinos.8 consequently, the different approaches 
5)
  this breakdown of Member States has been taken from: Swiss Institute of Comparative Law [14]. these 
member states are Austria, Belgium, cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, ireland, lux-
embourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia (paragraph 3.1.1).
6)
  this is the case in Austria, Belgium, the czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, ireland, italy, latvia, lithuania, luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom (ibid., Swiss institute of comparative law, paragraph 3.1.2). the 
number of licences which a Member State makes available is not always subject to a limit, e. g., licences 
for bookmakers offices under the UK’s Gambling Act 2005.
7)
  Ibid. See Swiss institute of comparative law, paragraphs 3.1.3 and 3.1.4.
8)
  One example is that of Dutch residents who, before the advent of Holland casino operations in 1976, 
travelled to Belgian casinos located in Blankenberge, Oostende and Spa. Given the accessibility of internet 
gambling for those with a home internet connection, internet gambling may constitute an attractive alterna-
tive even for those who live in the vicinity of offline gambling opportunities, such as bingo halls, casinos 
or sports betting shops.
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of the nationally focussed Member States’ regulatory regimes are more likely to come 
into contact with each other. this can occur in a number of ways, the most obvious 
of which being business-to-consumer whereby the gambling offered by a provider in 
Member State A is accessed by a resident of Member State B. 
However, the internet also facilitates business-to-business communications, thus 
making it easier for providers to access other national markets through the use of 
local agents, a model which will is seen in the case-law of the European court of Jus-
tice. it is often expected that current secondary legislation relating to distance selling 
and e-commerce will ease the differences between the various national regimes.9 Yet 
cross-border gamblig is not assisted by such legislation, and in any event, in the con-
text of the internal market gambling requires policy issues to be determined which 
secondary legislation not specifically addressed at gambling does not address.
3. Case-law of the European Court of Justice
Gambling-related case-law first surfaced in the European court of Justice in 1994. 
in Schindler,10 the European court of Justice was faced with a preliminary question 
from a United Kingdom court concerning the importation of German lottery tickets 
in contravention of the then-total prohibition of large-scale lotteries in the United 
Kingdom. the court of Justice considered that the prohibition of the importation of 
lottery tickets amounted to an infringement of Article 49 of the Ec treaty. Gambling 
was thus viewed as a service within the context of European community law. Since 
the prohibition in question amounted to an indistinctly applicable measure, the Euro-
pean court of Justice considered whether any justifications for the prohibition could 
be found under the ‘rule of reason’, as applicable in other cases concerning Article 49 
of the Ec treaty.11 the court of Justice referred to the ‘peculiar nature’ of lotteries, 
which it considered resulted from the moral, religious and cultural aspects of lotter-
ies; the associated risk of crime or fraud; and the fact that lotteries amounted to an 
incitement to spend which has the potential to lead to damaging consequences for the 
individual and society. Member States were left with a considerably large margin of 
discretion in which they could restrict the supply of cross-border gambling services. 
if one could talk of a freedom to provide gambling services at this stage, it would 
have been a very weak freedom.
the prerogative of Member States remained unchallenged by the cases of Läärä 
and Zenatti.12 interestingly the court considered in Läärä that the assessment of re-
strictions on gambling in one Member State cannot be influenced by what is permit-
ted in other Member States. For as long as this field remains unharmonised, the court 
9)
  Directive 97 /7 /Ec of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of consumers in respect of Distance contracts, OJ 
l144 of 4 June 1997, p.19 and Directive 2000 /31 /Ec of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of informa-
tion society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal Market (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’), OJ l178 of 17 July 2000, p.1.
10)
  case c-275 /92, supra note 2.
11)
  in case 120 /78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] EcR 649 the European court of Justice developed the notion 
of the ‘rule of reason’ via which Member States could justify non-discriminatory restrictions on the free 
movement of goods on the basis of objective justifications. An equivalent notion for services has been 
developed, following case 33 /74 van Binsbergen [1974] EcR 1299.
12)




considered that national restrictions should be considered only in the light of national 
objectives.13 this contrasts sharply with earlier case-law regarding double regulatory 
burdens, such as that of Webb.14 Here the European court of Justice encouraged com-
parative inquiries as to the justification and proportionality of the restriction com-
plained of, vis-à-vis the requirements of the home Member States.
Following Zenatti, Straetmans commented that Member States were able to ‘exer-
cise value judgments …within the very wide margin of discretion accorded to them 
by the court.’15
the subsequent case of Gambelli16 was viewed as setting the outer limits of the 
discretion enjoyed by Member States.17 in contrast to earlier cases, the European 
court of Justice did not rule whether it considered the restriction to be indistinctly ap-
plicable but gave the referring court relatively detailed guidance to assess the nature 
of the national restriction.18 
consequently a European-based criterion, in the widest sense of the term, for as-
sessing restrictive national measures took shape. First, the European court of Justice 
explicitly brought the Gebhard19 line of case-law into the gambling sector, stating that 
measures “must be justified by the imperative requirements in the general interest, 
be suitable for achieving the objective which they pursue and not go beyond what 
is necessary in order to attain it.” Secondly, and for the first time in the gambling 
area, this was combined with, specific references for the need to take into considera-
tion the regulatory burdens which the supplier already faces in the Member State of 
establishment.20 However, most of the subsequent discussion has concentrated on 
the requirement that the restrictive measure is part of a policy which “limits betting 
activities in a consistent and systematic manner”.21 this is where the balancing act re-
garding state monopolies and those regulatory models which employ a sole provider 
arises; the justification of the restriction in the form of a single provider is based upon 
quantitative restrictions. However, this is not expressed in numerical terms and to a 
considerable extent it depends upon the policy decisions of the prevailing national 
governments.
Following this part of Gambelli, national courts have to consider whether any 
restrictions on the provision of gambling from another Member State are consistent 
with the manner in which the monopolist, or licensed operator, operates. thus, if the 
stated aim of the national restriction is to limit the demand for gambling services due 
to the dangers associated with gambling, it is difficult to prove that the national policy 
is consistent, or being complied with in a consistent manner, if the single operator is 
permitted to advertise heavily and refers to increasing profits as a motivating factor in 
its annual reports. Not only should this balancing act take place before national courts 
seized of this issue, but the relevant government ministry or authority should ensure 
13)
  case c-124 /97, supra note 2, paragraph 36.
14)
  case 279 /80 Webb [1981] EcR 3305.
15)
  Straetmans [10], p. 1001.
16)
  case c-243 /01, supra note 2.
17)
  Straetmans [11], p. 1421.
18)
  case c-243 /01, supra note 2, paragraph 65.
19)
  case c-55 /94 Gebhard [1005] EcR i-4165.
20)
  Following in the light of Webb, supra note 15 and case c-272 /94 Guiot and Climatec [1997] EcR 
i-3899.
21)
  case c-243 /01, supra note 2, at paragraph 67.
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that the monopolist reflects a consistent and systematic execution of the regulatory 
regime.22 
in November 2003, the court gave its judgment in the case of Lindman,23 which, 
unlike the proceeding cases, did not concern an indistinctly applicable measure but 
rather the application of Finnish tax law to winnings in a Swedish lottery. How-
ever, the European court of Justice continued in the general direction embarked upon 
in Gambelli by explicitly referring to the fact that the government parties involved 
had failed to show that there was a causal relationship between the risks which they 
cited, and the participation of their residents in gambling offered in another Member 
State. this raises the question of whether an evidentiary burden has been placed upon 
Member States when defending restrictive measures. 
the latest instalment in this line of case-law, Placanica,24 can be considered to 
reduce the margin of discretion which Member States enjoyed under Schindler. Al-
though the ruling in Placanica deals with a number of issues, the most relevant for 
this article are those considered under the heading ‘licensing issues’.25 continuing 
along the path established in Gambelli, the European court of Justice recognised that 
restrictions relating to the combating of crime and fraud can be used as a justification 
independently of the objective of eradicating the actual number of gambling opportu-
nities. consequently, a controlled expansion of gambling opportunities was deemed 
acceptable, and the European court of Justice noted what this may necessitate ‘the 
offer of an extensive range of games, advertising on a certain scale and the use of 
new distribution techniques’.26 there was no intention to curtail the availability of 
gambling or reduce the propensity of the italian population to gamble, and conse-
quently no genuine diminution of gambling services needed to occur. However, if 
the objectives of the national legislation were to only meet unstimulated demand as 
well as reduce crime and fraud it becomes less clear whether a policy of controlled 
expansion is permissible, and if so, the extent to which gambling opportunities can 
be expanded. 
interestingly, the court also referred to evidence adduced by the italian govern-
ment which served to illustrate the significant illegal gambling market in italy, which 
the government sought to eradicate. it would thus appear that in the light of Lindman, 
Member States have accepted that an evidentiary burden exists to justify credibly a 
restrictive measure.27
22)
  Holland casino, the Dutch state-owned casino operator provides an example. in their 2003 Financial 
Report they stated that ‘[i]t is expected that gross profits and net company results will further increase in 
2004. To guarantee an increase in profits during an economic recession, Holland Casino must continue 
to reduce its costs.’ (Holland casino, Financieel verslag 2003, p. 14). However, their 2004 Annual Report 
reflects a change in approach: ‘Holland Casino does not pursue a profit maximalisation strategy.’ (Holland 
casino, Jaarverslag 2004, p. 21). 
23)
  case c-42 /02, supra note 2.
24)
  Joined cases c-338 /04, c-359 /04 and c-360 /04, supra note 2.
25)
  Ibid., paragraphs 50-58.
26)
  Ibid., paragraph 55.
27)
  the EFtA court provided a further interpretation of Gambelli in a case arising out of the Norwegian 
government’s objective of establishing a sole right to operate slot machine games which would be granted 
to a state-owned body. case E-1 /06 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway, judgment of 14 March 2007 
(not yet reported). Arguably the EFtA court entered into far greater detail in considering justifications for 




4. Case Studies – Sweden and the United Kingdom
this section aims to provide some insights into the compatibility of two gambling pro-
viders with the case-law of the European court of Justice. Assuming that an operator 
does not deviate from the objectives of the national gambling regulations, their activities 
will be an embodiment of that national policy. As the European court of Justice recalled 
in Placanica, “… Member States are free to set the objectives of their policy …” and 
“… to define in detail the level of protection sought …”.28 consequently, the worthiness 
or otherwise of the legislative objectives are not called into question, but rather the con-
sistency with which they are executed. Gambling providers who operate in a restricted 
market have to balance the need to attract customers while not contradicting the reason-
ing behind the justifications for the national restrictions which are in place. these re-
strictions arguably provide numerous national providers with a monopolistic position.
Firstly, the objectives of the legislative regime in which the two providers operate 
will be briefly described. For the second part their attempts in securing the accessibil-
ity of their services will be discussed, with particular reference to the use of the inter-
net. At this stage the manner in which the operators balance the objectives of ‘their’ 
regulatory regime will be considered in the light of the ‘consistent and systematic’ 
requirement of Gambelli as furthered by Placanica. 
the two operators which will form the basis of the compatibility discussion are 
Svenska Spel of Sweden and camelot of the United Kingdom. 
4.1 the Operators and their Respective legislative Regimes
Svenska Spel is a 100 % state-owned body, and enjoys a monopoly in the provision 
of lotteries and number games, sports-betting and dog racing, slot machines and the 
operation of the four Swedish casinos, pursuant to the lotteries Act and the casino 
Act.29 the overriding aims of the lotteries Act are to protect the public from criminal 
elements as well as the individual from the negative economic and social consequen-
ces of gambling. Furthermore, it aims to protect the interests of consumers and control 
the profits made by lotteries.30 As part of its recognition of the negative consequences 
of gambling, Svenska Spel takes a so-called ‘100 % preventative approach’ towards 
gambling. consequently, Svenska Spel states that it aims to ensure that gambling is an 
enjoyable activity while keeping it within reasonable proportions and avoiding exces-
sive levels of gambling with the associated negative consequences.
in contrast to the Swedish situation, the United Kingdom national lottery operator 
camelot, a private company, has been awarded the licence to operate the national lot-
tery and other lottery games pursuant to a competitive tendering procedure.31 Having 
28)
  Joined cases c-338 /04, c-359 /04 and c-360 /04, supra note 2, paragraph 48.
29)
  Ömberg [19]. lotteries Act (1994:100) and the casinos Act (1999:335). the Swedish horseracing bet-
ting monopoly is held by AB trav och Galopp (AtG) and public benefit organisations (voluntary organisa-
tions) are permitted to hold lotteries and bingo under specific conditions.
30)
  See also the website of the Swedish Gaming Board, lotterinspektionen at www.lotteriinspektionen.se. 
31)
  While there is currently a single national operator, section 1 of the National lottery Act 1993 makes it 
clear that there can be numerous lotteries within the ‘National lottery’. However, a licence is awarded for 
the operation of the National lottery under section 5, and only one entity can be awarded this ‘section 5 
licence’ at anyone time.
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been awarded the licence to run the lottery by the National lottery commission, the 
operator thus holds a legal monopoly for the period of the licence. competition then 
exists for the entire market, and once awarded the single licence the operator does 
not face any competition from similar lotteries for the lottery-playing consumer base. 
Under the terms of the 1993 National lottery Act the regulator, the National lottery 
commission, is obliged to ensure that the interests of National lottery participants 
are protected while ensuring the greatest possible net returns for the lottery.32 
in contrast to the Swedish situation, revenue maximisation is a clear legislative 
objective and consequently the role of the operator is not merely to ensure the protec-
tion of players. it can thus be anticipated that activities of a commercial nature which 
would be ‘consistent and systematic’ with a restriction on the cross-border provision 
of gambling services in the United Kingdom would not be so in Sweden where policy 
objectives do not specifically concern achieving a maximum number of ticket sales.
4.2 Ensuring Accessibility While complying with the case-law
turning to the second part of the case studies section, the manner in which the two 
operators ensure the accessibility of their gambling products will be examined in the 
light of the European court of Justice’s case-law. However, before doing so, the im-
portance of accessibility from a non-legal perspective will be outlined.
Factors which encourage people to gamble, and in some cases lead to gambling 
addiction, fall into one of two categories; situational characteristics and structural 
characteristics. Situational characteristics include factors such as the location of the 
gambling supply while structural characteristics relate to the nature of the game it-
self, such as the pay-out interval.33 A key situational characteristic is the accessibility 
of the gambling service; the more accessible the supply of a gambling product is, 
the wider the audience will be. Furthermore, increased accessibility is considered to 
increase the uptake of gambling services, and has the potential to increase problem 
gambling – since those who may not have otherwise gambled may do so, and the 
formerly reasonable levels of gambling engaged in by some persons may become 
excessive.34
Evidently, state operators’ services have to be accessible otherwise residents will 
be discouraged from using such services. this applies to both offline and online 
forms of gambling: if the state-sponsored service is offered in too few locations or 
in an unattractive manner, illegal operations will develop. internet-based gambling is 
often portrayed as being of potentially greater danger than offline gambling, and so 
some Member States have accordingly deemed it necessary to permit the incumbent 
state monopolist to provide online gambling services. While the effects of internet 
gambling are currently not well documented,35 some concerns relate to the inter-
net increasing the accessibility of gambling. Quite simply players are able to access 
gambling services from the comfort of their home (or office36) computer. this entails 
32)
  Section 4, National lottery Act 1993.
33)
  Griffiths [4].
34)
  Griffiths, Parke, Wood and Parke [5].
35)
  ibid., p. 1.
36)





several side-effects such as the absence of social checks and balances which are as-
sociated with gambling in an offline casino or other environment, and the greater 
danger that a player’s judgment will be suspended.37
Yet to what extent should these services be accessible, and – bearing in mind na-
tional objectives – to what extent is the degree of accessibility relevant for the case-
law of the European court of Justice? to elaborate upon this point, the approaches of 
Svenska Spel to mobile phone based bingo services will be considered. 
in its corporate literature, Svenska Spel notes that it is the world’s largest bingo 
operator and offers bingo via mobile phone.38 Swedish residents no longer have to 
go to a bingo-hall to play, but can easily do so while on their daily commute. in such 
a situation the question arises as to how a national court (or the European commis-
sion) will assess whether the degree of accessibility is consistent and systematic with 
national policy. 
A possible approach could be to consider that offering bingo via mobile phones 
offers an alternative for Swedish residents who would otherwise take up the services 
of an offshore unregulated mobile phone bingo supplier. consequently, by playing 
with the state operator, Swedish residents are playing in a secure environment and 
this could be considered as ‘capturing’ residential demand. Alternatively, if there was 
no previous mobile phone bingo service in Sweden, it is conceivably arguable that 
Svenska Spel is diverting residents from other forms of gambling products which 
may have been offered by an offshore unregulated operator. Without evidence from 
some sort of market research to show otherwise, it is also possible that there was 
never a demand for such a service prior to the introduction of Svenska Spel’s service. 
if this cannot be ascertained, does Svenska Spel then overstep an invisible mark and 
offer a service for which originally there was no demand and could it thus in fact be 
said to be encouraging gambling? 
An answer to the question presumably would require evidence of consumer prefer-
ences and the substitutability of different gambling products. this raises the question 
of whether a state operator can respond to a product development and then offer it 
itself, or whether it can develop it and offer it before an unregulated supplier attempts 
to do so. Following Placanica it is arguably more consistent with the case-law for a 
national operator to take such a ‘pre-emptive strike’ while maintaining a consistent 
and systematic gambling policy. As discussed above, the European court of Justice 
in Placanica recognised the need for ‘an extensive range of games, advertising on a 
certain scale and the use of new distribution techniques.’39 However, the objective of 
the national gambling regime in question was to eradicate the use of betting and gam-
bling activities for criminal and fraudulent purposes and the prevailing policy aimed 
at drawing players away from offers of this kind. 
in contrast, the Swedish legislation places greater emphasis on protecting players 
from the danger of gambling. While this encompasses limiting crime and fraud, it 
also entails protecting the population from other negative consequences associated 
with gambling. consequently, this could reduce the ability of the Swedish operator to 
develop a particular form of gambling via a previously unused means of communica-
37)
  By using electronic money gamblers may not appreciate the amounts which they are staking.
38)
  Svenska Spel International [13], p. 5.
39)
  Joined cases c-338 /04, c-359 /04 and c-360 /04, supra note 2, paragraph 55.
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tion if an unlawful source of gambling was not already in existence. Further clarifica-
tion from the European court of Justice is required on this point; does the ‘use of new 
distribution techniques’ require that those techniques be previously used by unlawful 
suppliers whom the state operator is attempting to eradicate or may the state operator 
be the first operator to use those techniques?
Evidently, in the absence of any other source of clarification, the case-law needs 
to be further explained so as to ensure that Member States are able to determine the 
margin of discretion available to them in which they can achieve the balance of inter-
est which they deem appropriate. 
5. Internal Market Issues
As was noted in section two above, the internal market is extremely fragmented inso-
far as concerns the supply of gambling services. this has the potential to bring about 
at least two ways in which the need for European Union action to remove imbalances 
and inconsistencies when gambling occurs in a cross-border multi-jurisdictional en-
vironment is illustrated. First, by maintaining nationally-focused regulatory environ-
ments Member States do not achieve their own objectives to the greatest extent possi-
ble. As an example of this phenomenon, the use of responsible gambling mechanisms 
will be considered below. Secondly, the principles which underlie national gambling 
regimes appear to be of limited significance when a national operator acts outside its 
domestic jurisdiction. this point will be illustrated by the use of databases for betting 
on football matches.
5.1 limitations of a Nationally-Focused Approach
to counteract concerns regarding the dangers of excessive participation in internet 
gambling, providers of such services may include certain technical mechanisms in 
their software to prevent players from playing beyond their means, and ultimately to 
avoid becoming addicted to such services. including these mechanisms is especially 
important for state operators whose regulatory environment seeks to reduce the nega-
tive externalities related to gambling. As an illustration of these mechanisms and the 
associated limitations in the context of the internal market, the internet poker service 
of Svenska Spel will be used.
Svenska Spel offers internet poker, which includes certain mechanisms which en-
courage responsible play such as limitations on the amount of time played and money 
spent. indeed, to avoid their registered players suspending their judgment and failing 
to value the money spent on the site actual bank notes are shown. these reflect a 
coherent and systematic approach to protecting vulnerable players and are positively 
reflected by some of the early scientific knowledge in the field.40 
these mechanisms are part of a wider approach operated by Svenska Spel to en-
courage responsible gambling. the company operates a loyalty card, ‘Spelkortet’, via 
which it enters into a dialogue with customers and allows them to set limits to their 
40)
  See eCOGRA [2] in which players were found to generally find responsible gambling features on regu-




gambling patterns.41 By providing a one-shop solution, arguably the consumer is well 
protected and cannot avoid responsible gambling mechanisms by simply moving to 
the site of another nationally licensed provider, because such a provider does not 
exist. 
However, because of the ease of long-distance communication, a Swedish resident 
can simply switch to another supplier located in another Member State. the Swedish 
system currently only operates in favour of those with a registered address in Sweden. 
if similar mechanisms are developed in other Member States and require players to 
be resident in that Member State, then eventually all markets will be foreclosed and 
sites will draw only players only from their national jurisdiction. Member Sates not 
offering state-sponsored or state-regulated forms of gambling will simply deprive 
their residents of any responsible gambling mechanisms. Moreover, such innovations 
on the part of operators such as Svenska Spel could offer a blessing in disguise for 
those in favour of an internal market for cross-border gambling services. if all regu-
lated providers in those Member States where internet gambling is legitimate have 
to manage such responsible gambling features then maintaining cross-border restric-
tions on supply would undoubtedly appear disproportionate regarding the national 
regulatory objectives. 
Under the free movement of services and the principle of mutual recognition, 
boundaries upholding segmented national markets appear unjustifiable. the creation 
of a European Union-wide registration system and a single responsible-gambling 
mechanism (such as a loyalty card) would ensure a consistent responsible gambling 
policy being upheld across the European Union while respecting the freedom to pro-
vide services. consistency would be upheld across the community which shows the 
notion of consistency in a new light. the European court of Justice’s rulings address 
Member States as separate jurisdictions, yet without a degree of co-ordination be-
tween them, national policies hardly operate in a consistent and systematic manner 
when viewed from a community perspective.
5.2 National Operators Acting Outside their Domestic Jurisdiction
the interaction between gambling and other aspects of European community law 
also serves to illustrate the potential for inconsistencies to arise at the community 
level, as is evidenced by the use of databases. currently, state operators are not under 
a duty to uphold the principles which form the basis of their national regimes when 
acting outside their domestic jurisdictions. to illustrate this, the refusal of a state 
monopolist to pay for information regarding football fixtures will be used. Although 
Svenska Spel was party to the relevant case before the European court of Justice, 
many other Member States supported the Swedish operator’s position.
in 1999 Svenska Spel refused to pay a fee to the United Kingdom company which 
was responsible for handling the fixture lists of the English and Scottish professional 
football leagues.42 this company drew the lists of matches to be played in the leagues 
and published this data, which Svenska Spel subsequently used to allow Swedish 
residents the opportunity to bet on English and Scottish football matches. By declin-
41)
  Svenska Spel [12], p. 6.
42)
  case c-338 /02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd [2004] EcR i-10497.
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ing to pay the fee requested, Svenska Spel was cutting off a flow of income for the 
relevant football leagues. the question arose as to whether the relevant fixtures lists 
benefited from the protection accorded to databases under the Database Directive.43 
According to the European court of Justice, they did not. consequently, state mo-
nopoly operators who used this information to offer betting products to their residents 
and raise money for sports and good causes in their own Member States were no 
longer required to pay a fee to make up the detriment done to such funding in another 
Member State. this is in sharp contrast to Svenska Spel’s social responsibility report 
which states that “[t]here is a close connection between Svenska Spel’s operations 
and sports and it is therefore natural that the main beneficiary of our profit is sports 
for children and youth.”44
the Gambelli case-law relates only to the domestic activities of state operators. 
consequently, while operators such as Svenska Spel may not be legally obliged to 
pay a fee for fixture lists, this case nonetheless illustrates the discrepancy and imbal-
ance between the aims of state monopolies and their activities outside their home 
jurisdiction. the question should be asked as to why the sports and good causes of the 
home Member State should take precedence over those of another Member State.45 
6. Taxation Issues
Another issue inherently connected with the use of and possibly reliance on monopo-
lies for the supply of gambling services is the raising of money for good causes and 
taxation revenue. Even though governments cannot impose restrictions on the supply 
of gambling services to protect revenue streams,46 the very magnitude of such rev-
enue flows cannot be ignored. On average, European state lottery operators allocate 
33 % of their gaming turnover to good causes compared to 3 % for gaming firms.47 
However, many governments do not adhere to the principle of additionality under 
which gambling-generated revenues are only spent to fund projects which would 
otherwise have not received funding.48 this was one of the founding principles upon 
which the National lottery was introduced in the United Kingdom, for example. 
However, it has since been eroded with legislation from 1998 diverting funding away 
from “good causes” and to “innovative projects in health, education and the environ-
ment”.49 Arguably this amounts to a “covert siphoning off of funds from the original 
Funds for Government projects that should have been met out of taxation.”50 Follow-
ing this amendment, £2.4bn was contributed to the British Exchequer between 1998 
43)
  Directive 96 /9 /Ec of the European Parliament and of the council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protec-
tion of databases, OJ l77 of 27 March 1996, p. 20. 
44)
  Svenska Spel [12], p. 17.
45)
  this issue has been debated in the United Kingdom House of commons. See the Adjournment Debate 
led by Jim Sheridan MP ‘Football (Gambling companies)’ on 23 January 2007. Daily Hansard, columns 
1395 –1399.
46)
  See case c-275 /92, supra note 2, paragraphs 59-61.
47)
  London Economics [8], p. 23.
48)
  Ibid., p. 26 –27. 56 % of revenues generated by national lotteries went straight into state budgets, with 
only some of this amount having been earmarked for expenditure on good causes.
49)
  Section 6, National lottery Act 1998.
50)




and 2004. Given the magnitude of these amounts it is possible that some governments 
have become addicted to lotteries and monopolies, perhaps more so than the players 
they seek to protect. this should not stand in the way of creating a balanced com-
munity approach to the regulation of gambling, however.
7. Concluding Remarks 
currently there is substantial legal uncertainty as to how a Member State which seeks 
to uphold a restriction must maintain a consistent and systematic gambling policy 
to justify the restriction in question. As a direct consequence the outer boundaries 
of what is acceptable for a state monopolist to engage in have become difficult to 
define. Additionally, the extent of scientific knowledge in this field is limited in the 
European context, which contributes to the difficulties regarding the justiciability of 
the issues at hand. 
National governments must ensure that policies are consistent and systematic, and 
national courts may be called upon to assess this, yet a criterion for assessing such 
policies simply does not exist. consequently, the manner in which community law 
requires Member States to balance their concerns with a restriction on the supply of 
gambling is unclear. Furthermore, the fragmented internal market delivers imbal-
ances and inconsistencies which limit and possibly contradict national objectives.
it is therefore understandable that many parties involved in this industry are scepti-
cal of deregulation or the explicit transfer of any competences to the European com-
mission. At the very least the free movement of services jurisprudence and general 
principles of European community law must be respected. Yet it is unclear even how 
this is to be achieved, regardless of any issues involved in heeding the calls of those 
dreaming of a deregulated or harmonised gambling internal market. 
in the light of the ongoing discussions, two points should be realised regarding de-
regulation and harmonisation. First, deregulation does not entail a lack of regulation. 
As alluded to by Geradin, deregulation involves a change in the style of regulation 
and could perhaps be better explained as re-regulation.51 State monopolies are not 
simply removed and the gates left wide open for private operators to act freely. An 
entirely new regime will be enacted, as has been the case for various sectors which 
have undergone ‘liberalisation’, such as telecommunications and electricity. Deregu-
lation of the gambling industry would not have to entail the removal of safeguards 
against problem gambling and fraud, but rather would incorporate these into a com-
mon framework for the European Union. Yet the establishment of any framework for 
regulating the industry along these lines would require a careful balancing of objec-
tives and a transparent criterion for assessing permitted restrictions.
Secondly, others may talk of harmonisation. While the degrees to which certain 
activities may be harmonised vary, any subsequent margin of discretion left for Mem-
ber States over and above minimum standards set could perhaps only codify current 
case-law. Given the imbalances between Member States’ approaches to this sector, it 
is improbable that a politically acceptable compromise could be reached in the form 
of a ‘harmonisation directive’.
51)
  Geradin [3], p. 182.
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Nevertheless the status quo is unacceptable and a solution needs to be found. in-
stead of a selection of national courts reaching various interpretations of an unclear 
criterion and the European commission launching infringement procedures on an 
ad hoc basis, legal certainty has to be achieved. From the foregoing discussion, the 
repercussions of gambling policy are both national and European in nature. An initia-
tive needs to develop which can overcome the current impasse. As long as scientific 
knowledge on the effects of gambling, particularly internet gambling is lacking in 
some Member States, the funding of research by the industry would be worthwhile so 
that a clear portrait of the effects of gambling can be drawn. With a coherent picture 
of the social and crime related impacts in each Member State the question of whether 
national regimes and their execution are consistent and systematic, not only in their 
national context, but also within that of the internal market will be made clearer. Na-
tional balancing exercises would be based upon and illustrated by facts and figures, 
and thus their assessment in the light of existing case-law would become more ac-
curate. However political will will be needed to overcome the imbalances which arise 
at internal market level since these issues are not captured by case-law.
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